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Abstract: Katherine Dormandy’s “True Faith” aims both to classify possible modes of relating 
faith to epistemic norms in terms of three broad viewpoints. I advance two related claims: first, 
her categorization flattens the epistemological terrain by treating epistemic norms that operate 
at different levels as if they operated on the same level and thereby distorts the views she 
categorizes under Anti-Epistemological Partiality; and second, when rightly described, the 
noetic conflict involved in this view can be understood as waged between epistemic norms of 
different types and function.  
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1. Introduction 
Katherine Dormandy’s “True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith and in 
Defense of Evidentialism” is concerned with the role of partiality in religious belief, specifically 
with the idea that if faith involves a relationship with God and with a religious community, and 
if relationships are construed as requiring or encouraging partiality toward the other party, then 
it seems to follow that faith ought to involve partiality toward God and the community of other 
believers. The paper is focused, in particular, on the idea that faith is better, or more excellent, 
when it exercises such partiality toward God when there are grounds for doubting God’s 
goodness or existence, perhaps because this displays superior loyalty to the object of faith. 
Dormandy rejects this idea; instead of partiality, she argues that faith is healthiest and most true 
to itself when it shows “respect for evidence” about the object of faith, “even though this may, 
in a world like ours, mean forming negative beliefs about the object” [Dormandy 2020: 1].   
Dormandy’s paper specifies several proponents of the “partialist” viewpoint that she 
rejects. Her principal historical target is Kierkegaard (or perhaps Johannes de Silentio, or 
Johannes Climacus; she cites works by both of these pseudonyms and does not distinguish 
Kierkegaard from his pseudonyms, nor the pseudonyms from each other). In so far as the paper 
translates his views into the language and categories of contemporary epistemology, it is not 
wholly clear he would sign on to “anti-epistemological partialism” so defined, although it does 
seem evident that he would oppose Dormandy’s evidentialism. Kierkegaard’s model of the 
believer as an individual out over “70,000 fathoms” of water who nonetheless remains firm and 
constant does indeed suggest that Kierkegaard would accept Dormandy’s claim that existence 
will provide many challenges to faith; faith will show its mettle to the degree that it remains 
firm and constant in the face of the greatest challenges. He has Frater Taciturnus say: 
Spiritual existence, especially the religious, is not easy; the believer continually lies out on the 
deep, has 70,000 fathoms of water beneath him. However long he lies out there, this still does not 
mean that he will gradually end up lying and relaxing onshore. He can become more calm, more 
experienced, find a confidence that loves jest and a cheerful temperament—but until the very last, 
he lies out on 70,000 fathoms of water.  
[Kierkegaard 1845: 444–445] 
 
Since Kierkegaard repeats this image both in other pseudonymous writings as well as his own 
journals, it seems to represent an important image and idea for him; and the image suggests he 
would judge the difference between the evidentialist seafarer and the faithful seafarer to be a 
difference between “double-mindedness”—being possessed by a multiplicity of conflicting 
goals—and faith. The evidentialist seafarer, in constantly adjusting to minute changes in their 
epistemic environment, would seem to Kierkegaard to be in danger of being consumed by the 
constantly shifting sea, lacking a defined personality or concrete content to their life, and thus in 
danger of coming to no “self” in Kierkegaard’s sense, no stable self-conception under which 
they willed their life, whatsoever [Dormandy 2020: 5]. 
The complexity of Kierkegaard’s authorship, unfortunately, makes it impossible to 
provide an adequate response to Dormandy’s paper on his behalf. Instead, I will follow up on 
Dormandy’s suggestion that the Kierkegaardian believer “takes this doxastic leap” in defiance 
of negative evidence “in the Pascalian hope, against all probability,” that God exists and is good 
[Dormandy 2020: 5]. However, rather than Pascalian hope, I will focus on Pascalian faith. With 
the exception of his famous “Wager,” Pascal’s religious epistemology is not much discussed in 
contemporary debates about faith. Is Pascal one of Dormandy’s targets—is he an anti-
epistemological partialist? And if he is one of the targets, does his epistemology provide the 
Pascalian believer with an answer to Dormandy? In the foregoing, I will address each of these 
questions. I will argue that Pascal’s religious epistemology, while not identical with “anti-
epistemological partialism,” shares enough with it to come under Dormandy’s attack; and that 
his viewpoint reveals a shortcoming in Dormandy’s argument, while also illustrating a better 
way forward.  
2. Pascal on the Disorder of the Human Condition and the Function of Faith 
Perhaps the first thing we should do is to seek a vantage point from which we can 
discern what is at stake in the argument. Here, I think we can begin with a question: Dormandy 
mentions that the anti-epistemological partialists think that faith issues epistemic norms; why 
should it do this? Why would a belief issue norms regarding other beliefs? Dormandy says that 
this creates two sets of competing norms governing belief. If the evidentialists are right, it is 
hard to understand this phenomenon except as bad faith or a kind of special pleading on the 
part of partialists. Reading Pascal, however, suggests a different way of construing this. 
Pascal would surely agree that the “epistemic norm mandating respect for evidence” is 
strict, but insist that adhering to it strictly is more difficult than evidentialists like to admit 
[Pascal 1655; 1671: fr. 85]. Pascal the scientist disproved what his contemporaries largely 
believed to be an a priori truth, the impossibility of a vacuum, and who held that natural science, 
contra Descartes, can provide only mathematically accurate models of the world’s “surface” 
[Fouke 2003: 76]; Pascal the philosopher was a foundationalist who held that our only fully 
secure first principles were those whose negations are self-contradictory and that the 
continuous application of reason to our first premises or assumptions not only exposes 
uncertainty, it exposes arbitrariness and conventions (see especially the section of The 
Geometrical Spirit titled “The Art of Persuasion” [Pascal 1657–8]). Both Pascal the scientist and 
Pascal the philosopher depended upon “designing and tackling new problems as if to generate 
new areas of research within established ones, or inventing new perspectives upon the same 
objects” [Khalfa 2003: 125]. Establishing epistemic norms beyond this always involves a certain 
arbitrariness or conventionality; we recognize an indefinite number of other possible 
perspectives and possible understandings of the world but lack the power to identify which of 
these is correct. We cannot distinguish between natural feelings and fantasies or 
conventionalities [Pascal 1670: fr. 455]. In fragment 159, he toys with the radically historicist 
idea that, our true nature having been lost in the Fall, we are now custom all the way down.  
Fathers fear in case the natural love of their children is wiped out. So what is this nature 
capable of being wiped out?  
Custom is a second nature, which destroys the first.  
But what is nature? Why is custom not natural? 
I am very much afraid that nature is itself only a first custom, just as custom is a 
second nature. 
[Pascal 1670: fr. 159] 
 
In fragment 164 he argues that the accidental character of our origin produces insuperable 
problems. 
The main strengths of the Pyrrhonists—I shall leave aside the lesser ones—are that we 
can be in no way sure of the truths of these principles, apart from faith and revelation, 
except that we feel them to be natural to us. Now this natural feeling is not a convincing 
proof of their truth, since, having no certainty, apart from faith, about whether we were 
created by a benevolent God, an evil demon, or by chance, it is open to doubt whether 
the principles given to us are true, false, or uncertain, depending on our origin. 
[Pascal 1670: fr. 164] 
 
To arrest this dissolving situation, we need a way of determining a single, authoritative 
perspective. We could do this by coming to understand the “ultimate purpose,” from which we 
could then derive all of the “names” of things, that is, we could properly determine what each 
thing really is—and then we would know what was essential, trivial, important, irrelevant, 
natural, fantasy, and so on [Pascal 1670: fr. 738]. But an examination of possible “ultimate 
purposes” discredits all but two possible viewpoints: a radical atheism recognizing no ultimate 
purpose whatsoever, and alongside this the conclusion that that the human mind bears no 
proportion to the universe, and Augustinian Christianity, which interprets this same 
disproportion as an enduring disorder resulting from the Fall. “Faith” is understood as 
establishing a connection with the Divine that allows a person to progressively receive and 
secure more accurate first principles, including epistemic norms. Faith therefore has a special 
cognitive status: (a) it has the right to influence how we interpret the world, including our 
epistemic norms and how to accommodate apparently disconfirming evidence, and (b) it is 
resilient to being reinterpreted in ways that would hinder it from fulfilling this function of 
stabilizing our epistemic situation—in the manner, for example, that such functioning would be 
hindered by negative beliefs concerning whether God exists, is good, and is faithful. 
To understand how faith functions in the Pascalian believer’s life, we can best begin 
with how Pascal conceives of the relationship between faith and ethics. We cannot ascertain the 
correct starting point to judge ethics,1 but the primary way that grace operates is by 
transforming our moral feelings so that we will approve of God’s law and his purposes.2 This is 
because the primary result of the fall—the disorder of our moral feelings—is rooted in our 
unwillingness to accept God’s law and purposes.3 Knowledge of the ultimate purpose, then, is 
tied to knowing the proper “names” for things, but, because of original sin, we find the ultimate 
purpose distasteful and are inherently resistant to defining objects in relation to this purpose. 
One way of getting at this is to say that the first mark of faith is the experience of heterogeneity 
in so far as the moral awakening effected by God’s spirit introduces division between oneself 
and the world, but also and more importantly, division within oneself between one’s so-called 
 
1 “We need a fixed point to judge it. The harbor judges those on board ship. But where will we find a 
harbor in morals?” [Pascal 1670: fr. 576]. 
2 “To save his elect, God sent Jesus Christ to carry out his justice and to merit with his mercy the grace of 
Redemption, medicinal grace, the grace of Jesus Christ which is nothing other than complaisance and 
deflection in God’s law diffused into the heart by the Holy Spirit, which, not only equaling but even 
surpassing the concupiscence of the flesh, fills the will with a greater delight in good than concupiscence 
offers in evil; and so free will, entranced by the sweetness and pleasures which the Holy Spirit inspires in 
it, more than the attractions of sin, infallibly chooses God’s law for the simple reason that it finds greater 
satisfaction there, and feels his beatitude and happiness” [Pascal 1655/6: 223]. 
3 “This order is necessary to quell the rebellious will, which would otherwise make it impossible to 
embrace Christian truth” [Pascal 1657–8: 193–4]. 
“natural” first principles and the truly natural first principles we have begun to receive through 
faith. But in faith we know the proper names for things; we know that the name for the 
heterogeneity we experience between God’s law and ourselves is “rebellion” and that this 
division is to be closed by putting those principles that war against God to death.  
Thus, the “faith” of the Pascalian believer has a status beyond “belief” or “loyalty” or 
both of these together. Pascalian faith is also openness to and concurrent commitment to 
receiving the correct perspective on existence, a perspective that is received progressively and 
not all at once, and the reception of which is experienced as a division within oneself between 
apparently natural first principles and truly natural first principles.4  
 
3. The Pascalian Believer: Doubt, Faith, and Epistemic Conflict 
Pascalian faith secures a believer’s first principles. Regarding any such principle 
received in faith, there could be doubt whether it has been stated correctly or applied correctly 
to subsidiary cases and to one’s own circumstances. One can well believe that one must “love 
one’s neighbor as oneself” and yet come to doubt whether one really grasps what this means or 
how it applies. One may even be quite dramatically wrong about what such a principle entails 
for one’s circumstances, to the extent that one may have behaved in a manner opposite to the 
manner one ought to have acted. One may have failed either through failure of “mathematical” 
reasoning or through a failure of “intuitive” reasoning. Yet what faith cannot doubt is what the 
 
4 E.g., “There are therefore two natures in us: one good, the other bad. Where is God? Where you are not. 
And the kingdom of God is within you (Luke 17:21)” [Pascal 1670: fr. 509]; and “But fantasy is like and not 
like feeling, so that we cannot distinguish between these opposites. One person says my feeling is fantasy, 
another that his fantasy is feeling. We need a rule. Reason is available, but is pliable in any direction. And 
so there is no rule” [Pascal 1670: fr. 455]. 
person has adopted as “the ultimate purpose”: that God is good and that he exists. Those beliefs 
form the core of the corrective perspective one has adopted; and if they are abandoned, they are 
abandoned all at once, and thanks to the strictness with which the Pascalian believer interprets 
demands of respect for evidence, the individual must revert to what Melville’s Ishmael called 
the “colorless all-color of atheism” [Melville 1851: 198]—a world with no privileged vantage 
points, where all possible perspectives are subjective projections upon a fundamentally 
meaningless chaos.5  
Pascalian faith, then, cannot easily be subsumed to the kind of case Dormandy 
envisions. For conflicts between faith and evidence are not precisely conflicts of belief with 
evidence. The initially inexplicable fact that faith is associated with its own epistemic norms is 
due, according to the Pascalian believer, to faith’s being a received as a perspectival corrective. 
Her conflict is waged between evidence and the interpretive framework through which she 
understands the world, including that evidence. The beliefs that God exists and is good cannot 
be continually weighed against new evidence and adjusted through some indefinite series of 
finite corrections, because such an approach is appropriate when bringing evidence to bear on 
beliefs, but not when bringing evidence to bear on an interpretative framework.  
However, this also suggests an interesting possibility to which Dormandy may be 
entitled to restrict her claim—conflicts generated within the framework, when, e.g, it is through 
faith that one learns that “God is good” is to be understood in terms of the character of Christ, 
above all as exemplified in his ministry of healing, his teaching in the Sermon on the Mount, 
 
5 “I have never judged something in exactly the same way. I cannot judge a work while doing it: I have to 
do as painters do, and stand back, but not too far. How far then? Guess” [Pascal 1670: fr. 476]. 
and in his willing self-sacrifice at Golgotha, but then finds evidence that resists interpretation 
under this understanding. For example, one may understand “God is good” precisely in this 
fashion, and because one understands God to be good in this way, find some aspects of 
existence inexplicable and difficult to square with this understanding. However, even thus 
restricted, it would not follow that what is required is a finite adjustment to one’s belief that 
“God is good” precisely in the sense that we see the character of God in the life, ministry, 
teaching, and death of Christ. Making such adjustments would simply demolish the framework. 
Moreover, if faith really is “the gift of God,” as Pascal insists, and not “the gift of reason” 
[Pascal 1670: fr. 487], then perhaps resistance to faith is actually futile. For perhaps it is only 
possible to resist God’s grace for a certain amount of time and to a certain degree, in which case, 
perhaps the Pascalian believer who engages in making such adjustments will only involve 
themselves in a painful internal conflict, which could have been avoided by addressing their 
doubts and cognitive dissonance in a different, better manner.  
Then what may the Pascalian believer do when such doubts arise? Pascal says “But it is 
at least an inescapable duty to seek when one does doubt” [Pascal 1670: fr. 681]. I propose that 
this should be understood in terms of the example of Job. What Job does is morally, 
emotionally, and intellectually complex: he simultaneously shows faith in God and demands 
that God answer his doubts. In demanding that God answer his charges, he neither comes to 
doubt God’s existence nor God’s character, but instead rests within the relationship of faith that 
he has with God. Within this relationship what is required of Job is to understand the world in 
terms of God’s laws and character. Yet although such a project must always involve some 
conflict and uncertainty, it is possible for that conflict to become so pronounced, so marked by 
cognitive dissonance and emotional chaos, that the believer must say to God: “You must answer 
this!” Job consistently makes this demand of God and shows faith in believing that God can and 
will answer him. Job’s righteousness here is important because it is the reason why he is 
justified in thinking that the reason for the conflict he experiences is not the expected conflict 
due to the division between “flesh” and “spirit” but something rather different, something that 
God must answer for him. The Pascalian believer, then, experiences doubt, but he gives God the 
benefit of the doubt.  
Perhaps it is worth asking why Job, and likewise the Pascalian believer, feels it is both 
necessary and justified to ask God to answer himself. The Pascalian believer will say that she 
acts like a friend presented with apparent evidence of betrayal, evidence that is impossible to 
just dismiss, who demands that the friend explain herself precisely with the hope that she will 
answer the evidence successfully; the Pascalian believer demands that God appear so that he 
can defend himself.6 Any relationship requires a degree of harmony, and that harmony has to 
be restored even if there is no real wrongdoing, even if the misunderstanding is rooted in the 
necessary disproportion of finitude to infinitude.7 But faith means believing, no matter how 
 
6 It is natural to feel that in bringing ones doubts or accusations before God, one is sinning. It is therefore 
worth noting that there is another way of translating the famous statement in the New Testament book of 
Hebrews “Let us then boldly approach the throne of grace.” The phrase usually translated “boldly” or 
“with confidence” is παρρησία, which political philosophers might recognize as the Greek term for 
freedom of speech, meaning frankness, openness, or even license of tongue. Perhaps the currently 
favored translations offer powerful hope to those oppressed by knowledge of their own faults; yet the 
more literal translation might offer even greater hope to those whose doubts center on their anger over 
what God has allowed his world to become. To such persons, the verse promises that they can approach 
God with whatever they have to say. 
7 “If there is a God, he is infinitely beyond our comprehension, since, having neither parts nor limits, he 
bears no relation to ourselves. We are therefore incapable of knowing either what he is, or if he is. That 
being so, who will dare to understate a resolution of this question? It cannot be us, who bear no 
relationship to him” [Pascal 1670: fr. 680]. 
loudly one demands that God show himself, no matter how great the conflict between one’s 
evidence and the character of God revealed in Christ, that God can answer such charges.8 
Human beings, given our condition, cannot avoid sometimes or even often doubting. “But it is 
at least an inescapable duty to seek when one does doubt” [Pascal 1670: fr. 681] because, 
although “God is a hidden God,” “those who seek God will find him” [Pascal 1670: fr. 635].  
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